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The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions:
Why Explanations Matter
JAN S BREEMER
Since the early 1980s, the Western estimate of
Soviet naval capabilities and intentions has been
dominated by the expectation of a Soviet ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) 'bastion' strategy. Accord-
ing to this assessment, the Soviet Union's first and
foremost naval priority, in time of war, is to ensure
the survival of its SSBN force, so that it may contin-
ue to serve as a 'national strategic reserve'. The bas-
tion estimate also holds that the Soviets wilt seek to
guarantee this survival by deploying the SSBNs in
near-home waters, where they would enjoy the pro-
tective benefit of 'virtually all available Northern
and Pacific Ocean Fleet surface combatants/combat
aircraft, and about 75 per cent of available attack
submarines...'.'
In several earlier articles I have stressed the infer-
ential (as opposed to evidentiary) contents of the
bastion estimate, and urged that Western naval plan-
ners take a long and hard look before committing
their strategy and forces to the expectation that the
Soviet SSBN fleet and its 'pro-SSBN' forces will be
'dug in' in home waters? One response was that the
reason why the Soviet Union had chosen a bastion
strategy mattered little; that what really counted was
that it had made this choice in fact.
This article disagrees and proposes instead that the
different rationales that have been advanced to
'explain''the bastions matter a great deal. At the
'analytical' level, different explanations carry differ-
ent 'logical' weight. But far more important is the
strategical logic of the different bastion 'models'. It
matters for the substance, shape, and longevity of a
Soviet SSBN bastion strategy whether the origins "are
(a) doctrinal, or (b) material and technical, or (c)
bureaucratic.
Models of bastion strategy
This article reviews the different bastion explana-
tions that have been advanced by analysts since the
concept was first formulated, in the West, about 15
years ago. It shows that the broad consensus on the
de facto authenticity of a Soviet SSBN bastion strate-
gy conceals a wide diversity of opinions on Soviet
motivations. It also shows that the passing of time
has seriously undermined the plausibility of different
ascribed motivations. Finally, and most important,
this article shows that understanding why the Soviets
would have adopted a bastion strategy matters greatly
for the formulation of appropriate Western counter-
measures. This article examines three 'models' of the
bastion strategy:
D the doctrinal model;
D the material-technical model; and
• the bureaucratic model.
The doctrinal model
Two different doctrinal explanations have been
advanced on behalf of the Soviet bastion decision.
The older one, which is at the heart of the concep-
tion of the Soviet SSBN fleet as a 'strategic reserve',
belongs to James M McConnell. The more recent
one is the work of Michael MccGwire.
McConnell's thesis goes back to the early 1970s
and Soviet Navy chief, Admiral Sergei G Gorshkov's
publication of the Morskoi Sbomik series, 'Navies in
War and Peace'? Contrary to the opinion of most
analysts, McConnell claimed that the articles consti-
tuted an authoritative, Party-approved statement of
current Soviet Navy doctrine and strategic priorities.
The key doctrinal innovation buried within the
series, reported McConnell, was the de-cision, made
at the 24th Party Congress, to convert the Soviet
SSBN fleet into a strategic 'fleet in being.'
McConnell explained that the implications were
twofold: first, whereas it has been previous Soviet
doctrine for the SSBNs to participate in the war-
opening strategic nuclear strike, now they, would be
withheld for the purpose of intra-war deterrence and
compellence? The second, material implication was
the construction of the Delta class SSBN with the
SS-N-8. The missile's intercontinental range was
proof, claimed McConnell, that the Soviets intended
to ensure the integrity of their strategic 'leverage' in
protected home waters. He wrote:
No longer will Soviet SSBNs have to run the gauntlet
of Western ASW forces through relatively narrow exits
and then attempt to survive, precariously, on the World
Ocean. (The SSBNs would be kept instead) in local
waters, protected in a wartime environment over a pro-
tracted period by the main ASW and other forces of the
Russian fleet?
A few years later, Gorshkov published The Sea
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Power of the State? The book's message, claimed
McConnell, was the same:
Gorshkov appears to be rationalizing a political decision
to withhold a substantial portion of Soviet SLBMs from
the strikes of the initial period in order to carry out
'deterrence' in war, conduct infra-war bargaining, and
influence the peace talks at the end of the war.7
The 'basic' decision to set aside the SSBN fleet
for intra-war withholding purposes, he stressed, was
doctrinal; the decision to withhold in home waters
was made possible by the technical features (i.e.,
long-range) of the SS-N-8. McConnell rejected the
argument that the SS-N-8s might be withheld from
the initial exchange, and that.withholding was no
more than a Soviet option that was inherent in the
technical (read 'survivable') characteristics of the
SSBN. He wrote:
It is sometimes taken for granted that the Soviets have a
withholding strategy, simply on the strength of the
inherent capabilities of the SSBN in this role. I myself
am reluctant to equate capabilities with intentions,
especially when it is almost always necessarily a matter
of adjusting our perceptions of Russian capabilities
rather than Russian perceptions. The intentions them-
selves have to be demonstrated; and it seems to me the
particular case before us provides an objective lesson of
the truth of my contention, for whatever our percep-
tions of Soviet capabilities past and present, Soviet dis-
cussions before the 24th Congress indicated SLBMs
were to be used in a first-strike role, whereas after the
Congress the focus shifted from the initial to later stages
of the war, with an especial emphasis on the value of
the Navy in securing the war's 'political goal.8
Strategic Rocket Forces
An alternative doctrinal explanation for the So-
viet bastion decision has been offered by Michael
MccGwire in his book, Military Objectives in Soviet
Foreign Policy.9 In a rather startling reversal from
his decade-long critique of McConnell's thesis, he
concluded that a top level doctrinal decision and
not a built-in technical immunity, was responsible,
after all, for the Soviet SSBN withholding assign-
ment. McConnell, MccGwire acknowledged, had
been right—'his explanation and evidence were
wrong'.10
MccGwire reports that the rededication of the
Soviet SSBNs away from participation in the initial
strategic strike to withholding, can be traced back to
a" Politburo decision, in 1966, to abjure the
'inevitability' of nuclear war with the United States
and the corollary decision to give first priority to
plans and capabilities for fighting and winning a pro-
tracted conventional conflict. Soviet decision-
makers also realised, claimed MccGwire, that the
'safe' pursuit of this kind of Superpower war also
depended on the longevity of the countervailing
deterrence of their strategic nuclear forces. Naturally,
the task of deterring the United States from turning
a losing conventional 'long war' into a mutually-dev-
astating nuclear exchange was made the responsibili-
ty of the Soviet Union's most numerous and most
capable strategic arm: the land-based missiles of the
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Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF).
The Soviet Union's calculation of the necessary
'correlation' of conventional and strategic forces,
MccGwire has postulated, has been much more com-
plex. While the Soviets could be reasonably certain
that the SRF could enforce the existing strategic
nuclear balance, they could not be certain that the
credibility of their 'main branch' would not be 'out-
flanked' by American technological ingenuity. It fol-
lowed, says MccGwire, that the Soviets decided to
'hedge' and 'insure' against the possibility of an
American SRF-neutralising 'breakthrough': the So-
viet SSBN fleet was turned into a strategic 'insurance
force' that would be held back and protected in bas-
tion waters against the eventuality that, 'in the event
of war, the ICBM force could be rendered impotent
in some way or other . . .'? Were the latter to hap-,
pen, he postulated, the SSBNs would revert to being
a 'balancing force,' and be used immediately or later,
depending on military exigiencies.13
MccGwire concluded that the SSBNs' insurance
function may have outlived its usefulness, and may
be in the process of being taken over by the Soviet
Union's new land-mobile missiles, the SS-24 and
SS-25. He did not suggest what the possible doctrinal
implications for the Typhoons and Deltas might be.
The material-technical model
The material-technical explanation of the bastion
concept has come in two parts. The first has sought
to explain the Soviet failure to imitate the high-
tempo oceanic patrols of the American SSBNs in
terms of certain Soviet technical and operating
weaknesses. The second part has proposed that a
Soviet SSBN withholding option was made possible
by technological opportunity, i.e. the arrival of the
long-range SS-N-8, and not foreordained doctrine.
Technical and operational deficiencies were at the
heart of official speculations, during the second half
of the 1970s, why the Soviet SSBN fleet 'stayed at
home'. The 1977 annual posture statement of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) proposed that the Soviet
submarine fleet was saddled with a highly inefficient
overhaul system!4 Other analysts thought that the
SSBN fleet was short of proficient crews, suffered
from poor mechanical reliability, or was perhaps
without the command and control arrangements
necessary for 'positive' control at long distances from
home.15
Benefits of new Deltas
Technical vulnerability was also cited as the So-
viet reason for development of the SS-N-8. Defense
Secretary Donald H Rumsfield thought, in 1977, that
production of the Yankee class had stopped, 'in part,
no doubt, because the boats would have to go on sta-
tion within range of US and allied ASW forces in
order to cover targets in the United States'."5 The
new Deltas, armed with SS-N-8s, he explained, bene-
fited the Soviet Union in two ways:
D they could 'cover major targets in the United
States from launchpoints as distant as the Barents
Sea and the North Pacific'; and
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D 'such deployments, relatively close to home ports,
allow more time on station (the equivalent of
having additional SSBNs) and provide a degree of
sanctuary from anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
forces.'17 .
Before he had come to the conclusion that a doc-
trinal shift underlay the creation of the bastions after
all, MccGwire had been the staunchest defender of
the technical rationale for Soviet SSBN withhold-
ing. Some or even all Soviet SLBMs, be they the
(relatively) short-range Yankee-based SS-N-6 or the
much longer-range SS-N-8, he argued, could and
probably would be withheld from the initial
• exchange. But, he insisted, in 1976, that
the evidence in the Gorshkov series will not support
the conclusion that Gorshkov is advocating a doctrinal
rationalisation for the political decision to withhold a
substantial portion of Soviet SLBM in order to carry
out 'deterrence' in war, conduct intra-war bargaining
and influence the peace talks at the end of the war.18
SS-N-8 overcomes SS-N-6
Instead, come war, Soviet 'decisions on [the
SSBNs'] use will depend on evolving operational
requirements, the course and nature of the war, and
the opportunities to influence its outcome.'19 Natur-
ally, explained MccGwire, all but the few forward-
deployed Yankees would be withheld from the
opening strategic salvo, for the simple reason that
their movement to within SS-N-6 launch distance of
continental US targets had to await the preliminary
destruction of key Western ASW defences.20 Mcc-
Gwire conceded that the intercontinental-range
Delta-carried SS-N-8 had overcome the Yankee-
based SS-N-6 time-distance constraint. In this case,
he averred, the option to withhold was no more than
a function of the weapon's technical characteristics:
The option of being withheld from the initial nuclear
exchange is inherent in any weapon system which has a
high chance of surviving that exchange . . . the way in
which such systems are used will depend on the unfore-
seeable circumstances and requirements of the post-
exchange period. It is unlikely that a military-political
leadership would be prepared to tie their hands as to use
or non-use, in advance?
The bureaucratic model
The most intriguing explanation of the Soviet
bastion choice is perhaps the one that has sought to
link techno-strategic opportunities and constraints
with what is held to be the Soviet Navy's perception
of its 'organisational essence'. As defined by the
term's originator, Morton H Kaplan, organisational
essence is
the view held by the dominant group in the organisa-
tion of what the missions and capabilities should be?2
Derived from the study of the behaviour of large
organisations, the concept proposes that national
defence choices are rarely, if ever, the product of
pure 'rationality' in the service of the 'national'
interest. Decisions on policy, military doctrine, or
weapons are said instead to accommodate and mirror
a mix of national and competing institutional inter-
ests. Political prudence dictates that the organisation
craft its stand in a way that does not invite accusa-
tions of self-aggrandising parochialism; the 'solution'
is to reformulate organisational preferences as
national preferences, or to recast new capabilities or
programmes that promote the organisation's essence
as evolutionary continuities of organisational mis-
sions that already exist and have long been agreed
upon. For example, during the 1950s, the US Army
would justify its long-range ballistic missile pro-
gramme as a natural extension of its artillery role,
and the Air Force would claim responsibility for
developing the intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) by portraying it as an unmanned strategic
bomber. Similarly, the US Navy has found that cost-
ly shipbuilding programmes are likely to be funded
more readily if they are justified in terms of interna-
tional obligations and coalition warfare instead of
unilateral US, or even worse, US Navy purposes.
The notion that the Soviet SSBN bastions are
perhaps a creature of Soviet Navy institutional inter-
ests is implicit in the argument that the reassignment
of Soviet naval general purposes forces from
The Typhoon class has few of the acoustic vulnerabilities that marked
the first-generation Soviet SSBNs, yet is still widely expected to limit
its wartime patrols to near-home bastion waters.
(Photo: US DoD)
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the priority, in the 1960s, of combatting US SSBNs
to protecting Soviet SSBNs was motivated by the
realisation that the technical chances of carrying off
the former were close to nil. It suggests that the
pro-SSBN mission came about because of a fleet in
search-of-a-mission.
McGruther's argument
The most compelling bureaucratic model of the
bastion strategy is the work of Kenneth R
McGruther in his book, The Evolving Soviet Navy}3
Writing in 1978, McGruther reported that the new
types of ships and weapons being fielded by the Sovi-
et Navy were 'to a great extent only explainable in
terms of economic pressures, bureaucratic politics,
and institutional perspectives'.24 He agreed that the
'first-generation' Soviet blue water fleet of the 1960s
had truthfully been the 'rational' product of threat-
responsive necessity and the technologies then at
hand. Next however, 'possessed of new impressive
looking ships and powerful weapon systems,' the
naval leadership looked for 'the trick... to find a way
to continue the existing trend by expanding the
rationale—or finding a new one1.25
McGruther believes that the Soviet political lead-
ership was initially sold on the Navy's vision of a
'dream fleet' with the full panoply of cruisers and air-
craft carriers, when it 'bought' the promise that a
'balanced fleet' would join with other aerospace
defence forces, and contribute to the national task of
deflating the weight of an enemy ballistic missile
attack. Once the 'new' Soviet Navy had put to sea
however, its leadership reputedly discovered that the
practicality of 'strategic' ASW fell far short of the
promise, and that preservation of the organisation's
essence called for a different rationale. The Navy's
'solution', claims McGruther, was the 'notion of
designing (or at least justifying) other portions of the
fleet in terms of protecting (the) SSBNs... ' . Presum-
ably, the Navy's reasoning turned on the awareness
that a safe and secure strategic retaliatory force had
become a national priority, and that it would there-
fore be
much better to justify forces with arguments that are
easily understood, that appeal to the general instincts of
higher echelons, and that correspond closely with what
others are doing?6
In short, the bureaucratic model interprets the
SSBN bastions as evidence of. a Soviet Navy
'militarism' that is largely irrelevant to military
efficiency.27
Why explanations matter
What is striking about the foregoing discussion is
that the small group of Western specialist who have
made the study of Soviet naval matters their liveli-
hood encompasses such a wide divergence of opin-
ions about the 'whys' and 'wherefores'. Its members
do, after all, read die same literature, publish in the
same journals, and have equal access, more or less, to
the same classified intelligence data. It is said that
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the 'facts' never speak for themselves, and it is there-
fore tempting to conclude that the reality of the bas-
tions is very short on evidence, but very long on
inference!
But does it really matter that inferences do not
agree as long as the 'facts' do? How important is it to
understand the potential opponent's motivations as
long as one has deciphered his behaviour in practice?
This article proposes that it does. At the broadest
level of international behaviour, it clearly makes a
difference for the kinds,of policies that the West
might pursue if Soviet goals are believed to be mo-
tivated by ideological aspirations and methods that
reject conventional calculations of inter-state con-
duct. Clearly also, the 'right' military decision, be it
doctrinal or hardware, depends, in part, on the
expectation that it will make a difference for the
opponent's calculations; a strategic force posture and
doctrine built around the concept of 'assured destruc-
tion' would make little sense without the assumption
of mutual rationality.
START
If this line of reasoning is accepted, it follows that
understanding the Soviet SSBN bastion rationale is
an important matter for Western defence planners. If
a bastion strategy was forced upon the Soviet Union
because of certain technical constraints, then the
elimination of those constraints will presumably
bring about a different SSBN patrol routine. As an
example, if, as have been speculated by some ana-
lysts, the bulk of the Soviet strategic submarine fleet
is kept in port due to a shortage of qualified crews, a
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) might
just serve to solve this problem. It has been estimated
that START could result in a 'high-quality' Soviet
SSBN force of Typhoons and Delta IVs numbering no
more than about 10. In that case, crew selection and
training can be more rigorous, and the task of creat-
ing the command and control arrangements for keep-
ing a large percentage of the fleet at sea more
manageable.
Face-saving device
The bureaucratic explanation is the most intrigu-
ing of the three bastion models discussed. It is also
the most volatile of the three, for the simple reason
that it is self-negating. If it is true that Soviet naval
declaratory doctrine bears little relationship to the
forces actually being built, but mirrors instead what
the Navy believes will 'sell' at the Politburo, then
clearly, the West can afford few certain expectations
about the Soviet Navy's 'real' wartime designs. If the
bastions and the Soviet fleet's pro-SSBN defensive
task are part and parcel, in fact, of an internal pro-
curement strategy, no clue is given as to the actual
war-fighting strategy of either the strategic or general
purpose aspects of Soviet naval power.
The claim by McGruther and others that the pro-
SSBN mission may have been 'invented' by the
Soviet Navy as a face-saving device when the leader-
ship had presumably come to recognise that the ear-
lier anti-SSBN justification for its 'dream fleet' had
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become untenable, is doubtful on at least two counts.
In the first place, it confuses Soviet declarations of
naval tasks with actual wartime functions. When
Soviet naval writers cite the defeat of the opponent's
SSBNs as a 'main' or 'national' task, they connote
ambitions—not necessarily the war-fighting roles
and missions of capabilities already in hand. Anti-
SSBN operations and capabilities necessarily became
a Soviet Navy requirement for the simple reason that
only military organisations are responsible and can
create the wherewithal for countering new external
threats. It is quite certain that the Soviet Navy of
the 1980s is incapable of carrying off a strategic
ASW campaign with more than perhaps a 'token'
measure of success; its prospects more than 15 years
ago, when the alleged conversion to pro-SSBN was
made, were even dimmer. This is not the same as
saying, however, that the Soviets have given up on
the ambition of neutralising the Western
SSBN—recent Soviet writings point to a quite con-
trary conclusion.28
An easier strategy to perform
The second difficulty with the argument that the
preservation of organisational essence prompted the
Soviet Navy hierarchy to change the terms of the
'balanced fleet debate' and advocate the merits of a
pro- instead of anti-SSBN strategy, is the implication
that the first is, somehow, easier to perform. While
no one has yet fought a strategic ASW campaign
either against or in support of SSBNs, it is not clear
at all that this is so. Indeed, a strong case can be
made that the kind of Soviet SSBN 'bastion defence'
that has been portrayed in Western writings may be
much more difficult to carry off (and at considerable
risk) than a strategic, damage-limiting offensive
against the opponent's SSBNs. For example, can a
Soviet command and control system that some ana-
lysts claim is incapable of 'managing' a US-style
oceanic SSBN patrol routine, be realistically expect-
ed to efficiently orchestrate the wartime pro-SSBN
patrols of many dozens of'shotgun-riding' attack •sub-
marines, surface combatants, and maritime patrol
aircraft? And if the assessment, since the early 1980s,
is correct, that the Soviet Union plans to hide its
Typhoons and Deltas underneath the north polar ice,
then how did the Soviet Navy leadership go about
persuading the General Staff and Politburo that
Kirov-size battlecruisers and Tbilisi class aircraft car-
riers were mandatory prerequisites for an arctic bas-
tion strategy? It has been proposed by some members
of Mikhail Gorbachev's coterie of strategic academi-
cians that pre-gtasnost military programmes were
decided upon in secrecy and without the benefit of
responsible civilian oversight, but that, from now on,
scrutinous calculations of cost and efficiency will
dictate which and how Soviet national security
objectives are to be achieved. Perhaps so. But if it is
indeed true that the pre-perestroika military leader-
ship had a, more or less, free hand in deciding how
and in what programmes defence roubles would be
invested, then there seems to have been little need
for the Navy's convoluted balanced fleet rationale.
Finally, should one accept the hypothesis that it
was a shortfall in capabilities that compelled the
Soviet Navy to trade in its anti-SSBN role for a new
pro-SSBN mission? Is the implication therefore that,
assuming the fleet can 'fix' its strategic ASW poten-
tial, it will revert to the 'old' mission? And if so, does
that mean that the bastions will cease to exist?
One-time gap will narrow
The material-technical model that holds that a
bastion strategy was forced upon the Soviets due to
their SSBNs' acoustic vulnerability, made good sense
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Yankees
and the early Deltas were noisy boats that stood little
chance of escaping detection while in transit to their
Atlantic and Pacific patrol stations. The hypothesis
nevertheless raises a question: why should the Sovi-
ets have been particularly worried that their SSBNs
were being detected and perhaps even tracked
throughout their patrols in peacetime? If they were
concerned (and this seems extremely unlikely) that
Western ASW forces might strike-out-of-the-blue,
they could hardly have seized upon a worse solution
than a bastion strategy that evidently keeps most of
the boats tied up in a few highly geographically con-
centrated ports and harbours:9
The problem with single-cause explanations of the
Soviet Navy's bastion strategy is that when the
alleged cause is removed, the explanation is neces-
sarily falsified. This appears to be the fate of the
material-technical model. If vulnerability to detec-
tion was indeed the original rationale for the bas-
tions, then the Western solution for maintaining this
state of affairs (if this is indeed desirable) is obvious:
'push' technology to maintain the West's detection
advantage. Unfortunately, a series of widely-
publicised reports and testimony by Western ASW
experts and high-level naval officials in recent years
have left little doubt that the one-time 'gap' will
probably continue to narrow instead'0 In 1987, the
former Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
(SACLANT), Admiral Wesley L McDonald,
described the Typhoon class SSBN as the 'quietest
submarine yet to be built anywhere', yet, as far as
publicly known, the Typhoon's acoustic superiority
has not brought about a change in the Soviet Navy's
peacetime SSBN patrol routine?1 The material-
technical explanation of the bastions says otherwise.
Declared policy of no first-use
The authority of the bastions' doctrinal model
hinges on the longevity of the inferred Soviet calcu-
lation of the purpose and conduct of a future general
war. McConnell's 'intra-war bargaining' and Mcc-
Gwire's 'insurance' models for Soviet SSBN with-
holding incorporate rather different appreciations of
that calculation. McConnell interpreted the with-
holding of Soviet SSBN fire as part and parcel of a
Soviet doctrinal presupposition that a war between
the two Superpowers would probably be general,
intercontinental, and nuclear. MccGwire drew quite
the opposite conclusion, namely that SSBN with-
holding was the logical corollary to a new (since the
mid-1960s) Soviet doctrinal presumption against
37
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general nuclear war.
It is fair to say that most Western students of So-
viet military affairs agree that the Soviet Union has
rejected nuclear war as the 'inevitable' or even the
most likely form of large-scale East-West hostilities.
Many believe that the Soviets are serious about their
declared policy of no first-use, and that the General
Staffs contingency planning has placed priority on
conventional weapons for war-fighting and on nuc-
lear weapons for deterring the West's first-use of
atomic force.
Permanent solution with SS-24s and SS-25s
If this assessment is correct, important questions
are raised for the intra- and post-war bargaining
utility of a withheld Soviet SSBN fleet. If the Soviet
Union has indeed come to the conclusion that not
even the 'cause' of a war with the United States war-
rants the use of nuclear force, it is difficult to see why
it would then take the risk and try to influence the
course of (conventional) hostilities by way of strate-
gic nuclear blackmail. Furthermore, the intra- or
post-war coercive promise of the withheld SSBNs
would presumably depend on the prevalence of an
overall favourable correlation of strategic nuclear
forces. That is to say, the withheld SSBNs would
(and could) come into their own as a war-influenc-
ing lever only if and when the initial land-based
strikes had produced a Soviet 'strategic advantage'.
But a conventional war will leave the strategic
inventories on both sides intact, and therefore keep
the Soviet Union from obtaining the favourable post
first-exchange balance of strategic nuclear forces that
would be the prerequisite for the SSBNs' war-
terminating leverage. This being so, the question
becomes what intra-conventional war deterrence/
compellence purposes are served by a withheld
Soviet SSBN fleet today?
MccGwire's insurance model solves this question,
but it raises others. It proposes that the SSBNs' pro-
tected withholding assignment amounted to a (tem-
porary) 'fix', designed to guard against the possibility
of an American technological 'outflanking' manoeu-
vre against the SRF. MccGwire has also concluded
that the rail- and road-mobile SS-24s and SS-25s are
the Soviet Union's 'permanent' solution for land-
based ICBM vulnerability, that consequently the
SSBN insurance 'premium' will no longer need to be
paid, and that therefore the requirement for a bastion
strategy will become obsolete, and the bastions
themselves de-established.
A familiar ring
The bastions' 'insurance' explanation is attractive
because it has a familiar ring. It is appealing, in part
because it faithfully echoes the long-standing Amer-
ican reasoning on behalf of a strategic triad, namely
the argument that only a combination of manned
bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs can ensure against the
possibility that one all-out Soviet technological
effort might neutralise a single-leg deterrent.
The drawback of the insurance rationale for the
bastions is that it proposes to make the deterrence
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efficacy of the Soviet Union's land-based strategic
forces dependent on the survival of an SSBN 'back-
stop' that is least likely, in fact, to survive a pro-
longed conventional war intact. No one knows how
more or less successful (from a technical-operational
point of view) a Western strategic ASW effort might
be, but there is no doubt that some Soviet SSBNs
would be sunk. In other words, the security of the
Soviet SSBN fleets has, arguably, already been 'out-
flanked' by conventional Western ASW means. By
contrast, the non-nuclear wherewithal does not exist
today to 'dig out' the Soviet ICBM fields. If, as the
bastions' insurance explanation claims, the ultimate
purpose of the Soviet SSBN fleet is to guard against
unwanted nuclear escalation, then how shall the
Soviets react to the slow-moving cancellation of
their insurance 'premium'?
If MccGwire's doctrinal model is the correct bas-
tion explanation, and if it is true that the new
generation of Soviet mobile land-based missiles has
rendered the bastion 'interim solution' obsolete, it
logically follows that the Typhoons and Deltas
will assume a new withholding mission for a
purpose other than insuring against an American
technological breakthrough against the land-based
strategic leg. What could this new mission be, and
what are the implications for Western counter-
strategies?
Finally, if the doctrinal raison d'etre of the Soviet
SSBN fleet can indeed best be explained as the So-
viet Union's way of insuring against the possible
future vulnerability of its land-based strategic forces,
then what might be the 'premium adjustments' that
will follow if the American Strategic Defense Initia-
tive (SDI) comes to fruition, and 'outflanks' the
Eurasian landmass? Is it possible that the SSBNs will
'resume' their 'insurance' function at dispersed equa-
torial latitudes?32
Conclusion
Understanding why the opposite side makes
certain strategic choices, why it builds the kinds of
weapons it does, and why its military manoeuvres
and deployments are practised differently from one's
own does matter (hence the contemporary popularity
of so-called 'confidence-building measures'). It makes
a great deal of difference for the efficacy of Western
wartime counter-plans whether observed Soviet
peacetime SSBN patrol practices are dictated by
material constraints, doctrinal preferences, or institu-
tional interests. Depending on the explanation, the
likely wartime behaviour of the Soviet SSBN fleet
and associated 'pro-SSBN' general purpose forces
becomes more or less predictable, and so in conse-
quence, the ability of Western naval power to (more
or less) influence events. The Soviet Union has
never acknowledged the existence of a wartime
bastion strategy—it is strictly a Western construct!
This construct has served as a powerful descriptive
framework of Soviet naval behaviour, but it has
failed at the explanatory level of analysis. Because
of this, it can offer the analyst few 'plannable'
clues to the future modus operandi of the Soviet
SSBN fleet.
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